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THE VOIDABLE VOID MARRIAGE IN WISCONSIN
I.

INTRODUCTION

Tile XXIII of the Wisconsin Statutes is a revised code on marriage and divorce which has been in effect in Wisconsin since January
1, 1960.1 It is entitled The Family Code and it specifies the procedures
and requirements which must be met to contract a valid marriage in
Wisconsin. Certain marriages which do not meet these procedures and
requirements are declared void. However, many of the allegedly void
marriages are not in fact absolute nullities, a seemingly incongruous
result in light of section 245.002(3) which states that, "In this title
'void' means null and void and not voidable."2
In exact language, "void" is equated with that which is an absolute
nullity; it has a meaning separate and distinct from "voidable." Applying these terms to the marriage contract, they are in a sense antonymous;
and when they are not used precisely, they tend to obscure the legislative intent. This has in fact happened in The Family Code where certain marriages specifically declared void by one section are made merely
voidable by another. As will be shown, this legislative failure to dichotomize these terms permits the existence of possible inequities. It is
the purpose of this comment to point out these inequities by examining
the allegedly void marriages and by considering the questions which the
Code leaves unanswered regarding the status of the parties to these
marriages.
II. AVOIDANCE OF THE MARRIAGE Is CONTROLLED BY STATUTE
Any examination of the marriage laws of a jurisdiction of necessity
requires a consideration of both the statutory law and the case law of
the jurisdiction. Therefore, before proceeding further, it is necessary
to place these referents in their proper perspective.
In Wisconsin, the action for annulment is the proper remedy to
set aside a void marriage.3 Of annulment the court has stated:
[W]e deem it proper to say that we can see no valid reason
for holding otherwise than that the jurisdiction and power to
annul is . . . exclusively of statutory creation and neither rest

upon nor can be extended by resort to the general equitable
4
powers inherent in the circuit court as a court of equity.

The courts will look exclusively to the statutes in determining the basic
question of whether a marriage can be annulled. It is not the function
of the court to do equity between the parties; it is instead their func'Wis. LAWS 1959, Ch. 595.
2 vArs. STAT. §245.002(3) (1963). Unless otherwise stated, all subsequent statu-

tory references will be to the 1963 Wisconsin Statutes.
Lyannes v. Lyannes, 171 Wis. 381, 177 N.W. 683 (1920).
4Id. at 392, 177 N.W. at 687.
3
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tion to construe the existing statutes and apply them to the individual
cases. As stated in Kuehne v. Kuehne:
In this state it is held that the jurisdiction of a court to
annul a marriage is statutory, and that such a judgment may be
entered only for the reasons authorized by statute. 5
The Kuehne case is patently clear on this point. The court may annul
a marriage only if there exists one of the statutory grounds for annulment-expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Consistent with this rule, where a ground for annulment does exist,
the court must then grant the annulment. As stated in Eliot v. Eliot,
an action for annulment in which the statutory conditions for annulment were present:
[H]ad the legislature intended other restrictions upon the right
of action, it would have expressed the same in the statute ...
In our opinion it is not permissible for the court to interpolate
conditions and exceptions and restrictions upon the right of
action, not expressed therein. .... 6
It is of interest to note that these rules will be applied regardless
of the equities that exist between the parties. In Eliot, the plaintiff was
allowed to assert the invalidity of a fact which he had previously
fraudulently misrepresented to the defendant and upon which the defendant had reasonably relied to her substantial detriment. This result
is supported on the basis of public policy, the rationale succinctly stated
in Kitznzan v. Kitzman as follows:
The state has the right to control and regulate by reasonable
laws the marriage relationship of its citizens, and the wishes
and desires, or even immediate welfare, of the individual must
public welfare as determined by the public policy of
yield to the
the state. 7
In substance, the state declares the marriage laws to promote the public
welfare; and the laws as so declared bind the courts.
As stated earlier, annulment is the proper action for setting aside
a void marriage. However, this applies only to a direct attack upon
the status of marriage. The marriage may also be attacked collaterally
and the court can declare the marriage void when rights incident to
marriage are in question in other actions. For example, in State v.
GrengsY a criminal action charging adultery, a marriage entered into
within one year of the divorce of one of the parties was declared
invalid by the court. In Estate of Tufts,9 contestant was held not to be
5 185 Wis. 195, 196, 201

N.W. 506, 507 (1924).

681 Wis. 295, 299, 51 N.W. 81, 82 (1892).

7167 Wis. 308, 316, 166 N.W. 789, 792 (1918). Cited also as Kitzman v. Werner.
8 253 Wis. 248, 33 N.W. 2d 248 (1948).
9 228 Wis. 221, 280 N.W. 309 (1938).
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the widow of the deceased, the court declaring their marriage void.
The introductory language of section 247.02 recognizes this right
of collateral attack. It states that, "No marriage shall be annulled or
held void except pursuant to judicial proceedings."' 0 By use of the
disjunctive "or" the legislature is clearly making a distinction between
annulment and avoidance. The importance of this distinction will become apparent later.
III. DEFINITIONS OF Vom AND VOIDABLE
At this point it is essential that we define the terms "void" and
"voidable." Of the term "void," the courts have stated that it is often
used in the statutes and decisions in a misleading way."' In exact
language, it is applied to a thing which has no legal force or effect
and is an absolute nullity incapable of ratification or confirmation. 2
In a less strict sense, it may refer to that which is merely unenforceable
or voidable. In this sense it is used prospectively to refer to a final
condition which will exist after the invalidity is disclosed and judicially
declared.' 3 Stated another way, that which is voidable is capable of
being either avoided or confirmed.
Turning to Wisconsin case law, it was stated in Land, Log and
Lumber Company v. McIntyre:
[F]ew, if any, words are more inaccurately used

. . .

than the

word "void." Sometimes it means void absolutely, and sometimes
void conditionally, and the courts are necessarily compelled, in
order to carry out the real purpose of the lawmakers, to determine as to each statute where the word occurs what was the
14
thought in the minds of such lawmakers ....
The court then quotes with approval the rule of statutory construction
that "where a statute declares a contract void . . . and where public

policy requires a strict construction, the word should always receive
its natural force and effect."' 5 This rule was similarly expressed in
Good v. Starker where the court, after discussing certain statutory
sections in which the term "void" appeared, stated:
Whenever from the nature of the transaction prohibited and
the purpose of its enactment such intent may reasonably be read
into such6 statute, the word "void" will be construed as so
meaning2
It is apparent from the foregoing judicial expressions that the court
will look to the intent of the legislature in construing the term "void."
1oWis. STAT. §247.02 (1963).
"L192 C.J.S. 1021.
2 Ibid.
'3 92 CJ.S. 1023.
'4 100 Wis. 245, 252, 75 N.W. 964, 967 (1898).
'5 Id. at 253, 75 N.W. at 967.
16 216 Wis. 253, 255, 257 N.W. 299, 300 (1934).
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Where (a) the public policy so requires, or where (b) such intent can
reasonably be read into such statute, "void" will be given a 9trict construction.
Relating these concepts to the marriage contract, it is clear that
"void" should be strictly construed; both of the elements which individually require a strict construction are met. Recall that the right of
the state to declare the laws affecting marriage has as its basis the
public welfare. The exercise of that right, therefore, results in a public
policy determination binding upon the courts. This meets the requirement of (a) above. Also recall the clear expression of legislative
intent in section 245.002(3), cited previously ("In this title 'void'
means null and void and not voidable."). Even the less discerning or
sagacious reader would find difficulty in misconceiving the intendment
of this statute. Thus, (b) above relating to intent is also satisfied.
That "void" should be strictly construed when applied to the marriage contract is supported in part by the case law. In Lyannes v.
Lvannes the court stated:
In the void marriage the relationship of the parties, so far
as its being legal is concerned, is an absolute nullity from its
very beginning and cannot be ratified. It may be questioned at
any time during the life of both, and, with some statutory exceptions . . . after the death of either or both, and generally

17
whether the question arises directly or collaterally.
In the first sentence the Lyannes case correctly states that the void
marriage is an "absolute nullity," however, this statement is limited
by the unfortunate language of the following sentence. These limitations are in conflict with the requirement that "void" be strictly construed, a requirement founded upon statutory language. As such, the
limitations expressed in the Lyannes case cannot, under present law,
be supported. The void marriage is, therefore, one which is an absolute
nullity and will be used in this sense in this article.
Having now established the definition of void, it becomes a simple
matter to define voidable. This is done by negative inference. As Wisconsin recognizes only three classes of marriage-void, voidable and
valid-by defining "void" and "valid" we finitely limit the term "voidable." The valid marriage having previously been stated to be a marriage in accordance with the Family Code, the voidable marriage
becomes the broad class of marriages remaining which are neither valid
nor void. Referencing this to the above quoted passage from the Lyannes
case, a marriage which may be ratified, or which may not be collaterally
attacked, or which may not be attacked after the death of one or both
of the parties is, therefore, voidable. This is the sense in which
"voidable" will be used in this article.
17

171 Wis. 381, 390, 177 N.W. 683, 686 (1920).
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However, although one section of the statutes declares a marriage
void, another section may except it from the void status making it
merely voidable. In such cases, a conflicting legislative intent is expressed. If the court were to take the most recent legislative expression
it would require that the marriage be considered void as dictated by
section 245.002(3)." s But, by the general rule of statutory construction,
where two provisions are susceptible of a construction that will give
operation to both, it is incumbent on the court to reconcile them so
that both may be given force and effect if at all possible. 19 In our case
this is not possible because the conflicting intents are founded upon
the antinomous concepts of "void" and "voidable." In this case the
court would be forced to make a choice between the two; and, as will
be shown later, this is often a choice between Scylla and Charybdis.
IV.

MARRIAGES DECLARED VOID UNDER WISCONsIN LAW

As stated in section 245.21, "All marriages hereafter contracted in
violation of ss. 245.02, 245.03, 245.04 and 245.16 shall be void .... ,20
These sections include underage marriages, bigamous marriages, consanguineous marriages, marriages in which one of the parties lacks
capacity to consent, marriages contracted within one year of a divorce,
and marriages in violation of the procedural requirements of The
Family Code. Section 245.10 requiring court permission to marry also
declares void a marriage in violation of its provisions. Each of these
marriages will be considered individually except those void for failure
to comply with procedural requirements. This will be considered only
incidentally.' Section 245.04 is Wisconsin's marriage evasion statute.
As the scope of this paper is limited to marriages contracted in Wisconsin this section will not be examined.
A. Court Permissionto Marry
Section 245.10 requires court permission to marry where one of the
parties is supporting children of a prior marriage not in the custody
of that party. It was enacted in 196122 and a marriage in violation of
this section is not made merely voidable by any conflicting language
in other sections of the Family Code. However this section was construed by the court in Estate of Ferguson,3 to have no extra-territorial
application, nullifying any important effect it might have had.2 4 The
IsCreated by Wis. Laws 1961, Ch. 505.
'9 State ex rel. Thompson v. Gibson, 22 Wis. 2d 275, 292, 125 N.W. 2d 636, 644

(1963).

20Wis. STAT. §245.21 (1963).

These marriages are void under §245.16 but may be validated by remarriage
in compliance with §§245.02 to 245.25. See particularly §§245.22 and 245.23
making certain §245.16 void marriages merely voidable by permitting validation by passage of time.
22 Wis. LAWS 1961, Ch. 505.
23 25 Wis. 2d 75, 130 N.W. 2d 300 (1964).
74But cf. Estate of Van Schaick, 256 Wis. 214, 40 N.W. 2d 588 (1949), which
21
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reasoning of the case is obscure and no benefit could be derived from
considering it further here.2 5 Also, the decision of this case may have
been rendered ineffective by reason of the recent legislative change of
6
section 245.10 and related sections of the Code.1
B. Underage Marriages
245.02(1) Every male person who has attained the full age
of 18 years and every female person who has attained the full
age of 16 years shall be capable in law of contracting marriage
if otherwise competent.
(2)If either of the contracting parties is under the age of
21 years if a male, or between the age of 16 and 18 years if
a female, no license shall be issued without the consent of his
or her parents or guardian ....21
Any marriage contracted by a male who is under 18 years of age or
a female who is under 16 years of age is in violation of this section and
is declared void by section 245.21. This is true also of a marriage in
which the male is between 18 and 21 years of age or the female between
16 and 18 years of age if the requisite consent is not first obtained.
However, section 245.21 in addition to making the marriage void, provides for validation of an underage marriage. It states that, "The parties
to any such marriage declared void under s. 245.02... may, at any time,
validate such marriage by complying with the requirements of ss. 245.02
to 245.25."28 But what is compliance with the requirements of sections
245.02 to 245.25, and is there compliance merely by reason of the parties
reaching the requisite ages or obtaining the necessary consent subsequent to the marriage? Probably not. It is more likely that a new ceremony will have to be had.2 9
In support of this contention, we must consider section 245.16 which
provides that a marriage may be validly contracted in Wisconsin only
after a license has been issued therefor. Taking this in conjunction
with section 245.12 which authorizes a license to issue only after compliance with section 245.02, where the parties were in violation of this
section, no license could validly be issued and where no license had isapplies the marriage evasion provision to the form of the marriage. This case
was not considered in the Ferguson opinion although its principal should
apparently be applicable to a §245.10 violation to give such a violation extraterritorial effect as was clearly the legislative intent.
25
See 49 MARQ. L. REv. 169 (1965).
2
6Wis. LAWS 1965, Chs. 121 and 480.
27WIS. STAT. §245.02(1)
(1963).
2sWis. STAT. §245.21 (1963).
29 See note to §247.02(6) et seq., Wisconsin Legislative Council General Report

Vol. V (1959) confirming this position. Former §§247.02(6) and (7) specified
that the underage marriage could be annulled by a party unless the party
confirmed the marriage after arriving at the statutory age. This provision
was amended by ch. 595, Laws of Wis., 1959, effective January 1, 1960, to
now require validation by compliance with ch. 245 before the right of annulment is denied.
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sued no marriage could be contracted. So, even though the parties, by
passage of time or by securing the necessary consent, comply with the
age provisions, there would still have been no valid license issuance
without which there could be no valid marriage.
However, this reasoning is circular and, without more, would be
extremely weak authority for the proposition that a second ceremony
would have to be had. Further support is available though. As stated in
Lanhan v. Lanhan:
[Wihere cohabitation is illegal in its inception, the relation between the parties will not be transformed into marriage by evidence of continued cohabitation, or by any evidence which falls
short of establishing either directly or circumstantially the fact of
an actual contract of marriage after the bar has been removed.30
The underage marriage falls squarely within this rule. It is meretricious
in its inception and would, therefore, require a second complete ceremony. Also note that the underage marriage can be annulled even after
the parties have reached the requisite age. 3' This would seemingly preclude validation of such marriages merely by cohabitation after reaching the age of consent, which was the rule at common law, because this
would prematurely terminate the right of annulment without legislative
authorization. Consequently, section 245.21, providing for validation of
the void underage marriage, in actuality is satisfied only by a second
ceremony. This does not validate the void marriage or make it merely
voidable.
But further consideration must be given to section 247.02 specifying
the causes for annulment. It indicates that the marriage may be annulled:
(6) At the suit of the wife or her parents .

.

. when she was

under the age of 16 at the time of the marriage ....
(7) At the suit of the husband or his parents

. . .

when he was

under the age of 18 at the time of the marriage. ...
(8) At the suit of the parent... of a party marrying without
the consent of said parent . . . where such consent is required

by s. 245.02, provided the action is commenced before said party
reaches the age of 21 years if male or 18 if female and within
one year after the marriage.32
Subsections (6) and (7) deal with marriages in which the parties are
under the marriageable age and give the right to annul to both the parties and their parents. There is no time limitation placed upon the right
of annulment by these subsections as long as the marriage is not validated by compliance with Chapter 245 which, as concluded above, would
require a completely new ceremony. However, under section 247.03 (2),
a 10-year limitation is imposed upon the right of action. It requires that
30 136 Wis. 360, 369, 117 N.W. 787,
31WIS. STAT. §247.03(2) (1963).
32 WIs. STAT. §247.02 (1963).

789 (1908).
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the action for annulment be brought within 10 years from the time the
cause of action arose, this undoubtedly being the date of the marriage.
Subsection (8) deals with marriages in which the parties failed to secure the necessary consent and it gives the cause of action to the parents
only. Also, it limits the right of action to one year or less.
On the basis of sections 247.02 and 247.03 it is clear that the underage marriage, void by reason of section 245.02, may not be subject to
annulment. The marriage can be annulled only by the parties or their
parents and then only for a limited period of time. However, as previously stated, the introductory sentence of section 247.02 states that, "No
marriage shall be annulled or held void except pursuant to judicial proceeding." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, although the statute of limitations has run on the action for annulment, this does not mean that the
marriage is valid. It could still be attacked collaterally and held void.
Suppose the parties were married 11 years so that the marriage could
no longer be annulled and that one of the parties then died. If there
were no children, it would be to the advantage of the parents of the deceased, if the deceased had any property which passed by intestacy, to
set aside the marriage. Under the language of Chapter 245, it would
appear that even though the parent's right to annul the marriage had
expired, as the marriage was void, they could still attack the marriage
collaterally in the administration proceeding. This argument would
be just as valid if the attack was made 50 years after the marriage.
Consider also the similar situation of a guardian-ad-litem representing
a minor child of the parties who might increase the child's inheritance
by avoiding the marriage and thus eliminating the supposed wife's
right to a statutory share of the estate.
However, the inherent inequities of this result provide a basis for
questioning the validity of this construction of the statutes. It is only
reasonable to assume that the courts would look for some grounds to
validate the marriage. This, as previously stated, would require as its
foundation, an expression of legislative intent. This intent might be
found in either section 247.02 or section 245.21. In regard to section
247.02, where the legislature has taken away the right of annulment
after a certain period, it might be construed as an indication that the
legislature intended to validate these marriages after such period. However, in this case, a marriage annullable for 10 years could still be held
void in a collateral attack nine years after the supposed marriage. Imagine the benefit a creditor could make of this construction of the Family
Code where, for example, he could eliminate the homestead right of a
pretended spouse of a deceased debtor. In this instance the inequity
would still exist.
In regard to section 245.21, it provides that the underage marriage
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may be validated by compliance with sections 245.02 and 245.25. If instead of construing this to require a new ceremony it was taken to mean
only the attaining of the requisite statutory age, the marriage would be
validated at this time. This, as pointed out earlier, would be inconsistent
with much of the language of other sections of the Code. 33
It is submitted that because of the inequities that could result from a
strict construction of the voidability of underage marriages, that this
was probably not the intent of the legislature and would not be so considered by the courts. The preferable way to handle this type of marriage
is to consider it merely voidable after the parties reach the age necessary
for compliance with the provisions of section 245.02 without requiring
a further ceremony. Although it would then not be subject to collateral
34
attack, the right of annulment would still exist. This, of course, could

be accomplished only by a statutory change.
To conclude our examination of underage marriages, it is necessary
to briefly consider the case law on the subject.
The case of Eliot v. Eliot35 involved a boy who, when only 15 years
of age ,represented himself to be 19 years old and induced the defendant to marry him. Before reaching the age of consent which at this time
was 18 years, he brought suit for annulment. Section 2350 in effect at
this time declared that:
[T]he marriage shall be void from such time as shall be fixed by
the judgment of a court of competent authority declaring the
nullity thereof.36
In commenting on the meaning of this section, the court stated:
This marriage is not an absolute nullity. It is only annulled
from such time as shall be fixed by the judgment of the court. Sec.
2350. That time may, and in many contingencies should, be fixed
at a later date than that of the marriage. During the time intervening the marriage is valid. It is, so to speak, a marriage on condition subsequent, the condition being its disaffirmance by a party
thereto and annulment thereof by the court from the time
named.3
So, at this time the marriage, although it could be annulled, was held to
be valid until it was annulled. This was due solely to the peculiar language of section 2350. This language was not retained in subsequent
statutes and as a result Eliot is no longer authority on this point.
The above quoted provision of the Eliot case was discussed in Swenson v. Swenson.38 However, the case was apparently decided without
33 See note 29.

If this construction was adopted it might also require an addition to §247.245
if complete equity is to be done between the parties in all cases.
35 77 Wis. 634, 46 N.W. 806 (1890).
3G Id. at 639, 46 N.W. at 807.
37 Supra note 35 at 641, 46 N.W. at 808.
38 179 Wis. 536, 192 N.W. 70 (1923).
34
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conscious appreciation of the issue under consideration. In Swenson,
the court stated:
The present statute and sec. 2350, construed in [the Eliot
case] are alike in that the marriage of persons under the age of
consent is voidable and not void. 39 (Emphasis added.)
So, the Swenson decision concludes that the court in Eliot found the
underage marriage voidable. This appears unfounded in as much as the
Eliot case specifically declares such marriages valid until annulled and
not voidable. For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that at
the time of the Swenson decision, the underage marriage was voidable.4"
The "present statute" referred to in the above quote presumably is section 235141 discussed in the opinion. No case has considered this problem
since the passage of section 245.002(3) which, it could be strongly argued, was intended to change the status of the underage marriage from
voidable to void as is specifically stated by the statute.
C. Incestuous Marriages
245.03(1) No marriage shall be contracted ...

between per-

sons who are nearer of kin than second cousins excepting that
marriage may be contracted between first cousins where the female has attained the age of 55 years. Relationship under this section shall be computed by the rule of the civil law, whether4 2the
parties to the marriage are of the half or of the whole blood.
By reference to section 245.21, a mariage in violation of this section
is void; and unlike the underage marriage, section 245.21 contains no
qualifying provision for validation. Therefore, relying solely on Chapter 245, the incestuous marriage would be void and not merely voidable.
This was supported in Dicke v. Wagner,4 3 the court concluding, "As
Ida was the daughter of the testator's own sister, it is conceded that
his marriage to her was, under the statutes, an absolute nullity." This
case permitted the avoidance of a marriage in a collateral attack after
the death of one of the parties. The statutes referred to were, in substance, comparable to our current statute. The same conclusion was also
reached in an opinion of the Attorney General,4 4 the rationale supported
on the basis that because incest is a crime it would be inconsistent to
39Id.

at 540, 192 N.W. at 72.

40 See State v. Cone, 86 Wis. 498, 57 N.W. 50 (1893) ; and 17 Or. ATTY. GEN. 351

(1928), supporting the proposition that the underage marriage was voidable
only. Also cf. note 29. Until 1960 the underage marriage could be confirmed
by a party after arriving at the age of consent without a second ceremony.
This automatically places the underage marriage within our definition of voidable.
41
WIs. STAT. §2351 (1921).
42 WIS. STAT. §245.03 (1963).
4395 Wis. 260, 263, 70 N.W. 159, 160 (1897). See also State ex rel. De Puy v.
Evans, 88 Wis. 255, 60 N.W. 433 (1894).
445 Op. ATTY. GEN. 227 (1916).
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permit the incestuous marriage any validity. As incest is still a crime,
this rationale would be appropriate today.
However, by reference to section 247.02, it appears that the incestuous marriage is in fact merely voidable. Section 247.02(2) states as a
cause for annulment:
Consanguinity where the parties are nearer of kin than second
cousins as computed by the rule of civil law, whether of the half
or of the whole blood, at the suit of either party except as provided in s. 245.03(1) ; but when any such marriage has not been
annulled during the lifetime of the parties, the validity thereof
shall not be inquired into after the death of eitherparty. (Emphasis added.)
As the validity cannot be challenged after the death of either party, the
mariage is merely voidable. Notwithstanding this, it is clearly the legislative intent that in all other cases, the incestuous marriage should be
considered void.
However, on the basis of section 247.02(2), only the parties can
annul the mariage and then, by reference to the 10 year statute of limitations provision of section 247.03(2), only if the action is commenced
within 10 years after the cause of action arose. This means that even
the parties cannot annul the marriage after 10 years. Of course, this
result could be avoided by holding that there is a continuous arising of
the cause of action but this would certainly be a strained construction
of section 247.03(2) .4 5 So, although the parties cannot annul their
marriage, they are prohibited from living together as man and wife.
Their only solution is to attack the marriage collaterally, for, as in the
case of the underage marriage, such marriage may still be declared void.
But by what action of the parties is this effected?
Section 247.03(1) lists the "actions affecting marriage." Recalling
the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if we are to have the
marriage judicially declared void as required by section 247.02 we must
look to section 247.03(1) for our action. The only two actions questioning the validity of the marriage are (a) to affirm marriage, and
(b) annulment. The annulment under (b) of course would fail because
of the 10 year statute of limitations. This assumes that "annulment"
is limited to annulment and does not include avoidance; however, this
assumption is seemingly sound in light of section 247.02 which specifically distinguishes them.
Considering subpart (a), such action, like annulment, is limited by
45 Cf. Witt v. Witt, 271 Wis. 93, 72 N.W. 2d 748, 52 A.L.R. 2d 1158 (1955);

and Ginkowski v. Ginkowski, 28 Wis. 2d 530, 137 N.W. 2d 403 (1965). In
these two cases which involve the marriage of an insane person and a bigamous marriage respectively, the statute of limitations extinguished the right to
annulment 10 years after the date of the marriage.
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the 10 year statute of limitations in section 247.03(2). It is also further
limited by section 247.04 which declares:
When the validity of any marriage shall be denied or doubted
by either of the parties the other party may commence an action
to affirm the marriage, and the judgment in such action shall declare such marriage valid or annul the same

..

(Emphasis

added).
By this section, in an action to affirm mariage, the court can either annul
the marriage or declare it valid. These are the only two alternatives
given. In light of this section, even supposing the 10 year statute of
limitations had not run on the cause of action to affirm, where the right
of annulment has expired the court could only affirm the marriage, a
dilemmic position for the court in the case of an incestuous marriage.
Certainly this situation does exist in fact. Certainly it is the intent of
the legislature and the court would so hold that in an action to affirm
by one of the parties to the incestuous marriage the court could declare
the marriage void; however, it is difficult to place this supposed result
within the language of the Family Code." It is therefore respectfully
submitted that the Code would be more complete if, during the lifetime
of the parties, the incestuous marriage was excepted from the 10 year
limitation on the right of action for annulment as is the bigamous
47

marriage.

D. Mental Incapacity
245.03(1) A marriage may not be contracted if either party
has such want of understanding as renders him incapable of
assenting to marriage whether by reason of insanity, idiocy or
other causes. 48
Again by reference to section 245.21, a marriage in violation of this
section is void. However, when considered in conjunction with Chapter
247, these marriages, like the underage and the incestuous marriages,
cannot always be annulled. They are subject to the 10 year statute of
limitation period of section 247.03 (2), and, they are also subject to the
further restriction in section 247.02(5) which limits the right to annul
to the parties or to the guardian of the incapacitated party. Section
247.02(5) further states that if the incompetent confirms the marriage
subsequent to regaining reason the marriage cannot be annulled. Under
these circumstances, the legislative intent would seemingly be to validate such marriages even without a subsequent ceremony.
This would make the right of avoidance coextensive with the right
of annulment. Although this would make the marriage merely voidable
-1 Cf. Ginkowski v. Ginkowski, supra note 45, involving an action for annulment
of a void bigamous marriage in which the statute of limitations had run on
the right of annulment and the court denied any relief to the plaintiff-husband.
47Wis. STAT. §247.03(2) (1963).
48 \VIs. STAT. §245.03(1) (1963).
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(the marriage being capable of validation), it would appear to be in accord with the legislative intent. This construction (making the right of
avoidance coextensive with the right of annulment) would be acceptable if it was applied selectively; for example, to underage marriages or
marriages not against the public policy of the state. However, if such a
construction was applied generally to all types of marriages, making the
marriage valid after the right of annulment has expired, the consanguineous marriage would be made valid after 10 years. Thus, this concept
cannot be applied generally, and as there is no legislative expression
authorizing a selective application of this construction, it must necessarily be limited to marriages of incompetents.
Turning to the case law, it was held in Kuehne v. Kuehne:
Although it is provided in sec. 2330, Stats., that no insane person
shall be capable of contracting marriage, the annulment of such a
marriage is not authorized at the suit of the public or upon
grounds of public policy. It may be annulled only at the suit of
49
one of the parties thereto ....
With regard to the 10 year statute of limitations, it was held in Witt v.
Witt 50 to bar the annulment. In this case the parties had married on
October 14, 1930. The wife was granted a divorce on April 20, 1939,
which was vacated in 1946 because she was found to have been insane
at the time of the divorce. Then, in 1951, twenty-one years after the
marriage but within 10 years of discovery of the fact of insanity, the
husband brought an action for annulment which was denied. The court
held that the cause of action arose on the date of the marriage and that
the statute ran from this date, not from the date of discovery. The husband was, therefore, unable to annul the marriage.
The fact remains that such marriage is declared void under section
245.21 and that as such it could be attacked collaterally. There is no validation provision, however questionable, as in the case of the underage
marriage, nor is there any prohibition against questioning the validity
of the marriage after the death of one of the parties as in the case of a
consanguineous marriage. Therefore, the same inequitable consequences
as those discussed in relation to the underage and consanguineous marriages could result. But if the consequences were unconscionable, as well
they might be, would they be supported by the court? It seems reasonable to suppose they would not. However, to state a possible basis for
such a holding would be speculation. There are no Wisconsin cases
considering the point.
E. Bigamous Marriages
245.03(1) No marriage shall be contracted while either of the
parties has a husband or wife living ....
49 Sipra note 5 at 197, 201 N.W. at 507.
50271 Wis. 93, 72 N.W. 2d 748, 52 A.L.R. 2d 1158 (1955).
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(2) It is unlawful for any person, who is or has been a party
to any action for divorce in any court in this state, or elsewhere,
to marry again until one year after judgment of divorce is
granted ....

51

To the reader unfamiliar with Wisconsin divorce law, the inclusion
of section 245.03(2) as a bigamous marriage might seem strange as the
words "judgment of divorce" connote a severance of the marital relationship. However, this is not true of the Wisconsin divorce; although
the decree is complete it defers severance of the bond for a period of
one year. Section 247.37(1) (a) states:
When a judgment of divorce is granted it shall not be effective
so far as it affects the marital status of the parties until the expiration of one year from the date of the granting of such judgment....

In construing this section, the court stated in White v. White:
Until at least the year had gone by from the entry of the
judgment in this case . . . the parties hereto were still bound by

the marital tie. [citation omitted] Until such year elapsed there
was in existence no absolute judgment of divorce, and 52consequently, no absolute severance of the marital relationship.
Consequently, within one year of the judgment of divorce, the parties
thereto are still bound by the marital tie; they still have a husband or
wife. Therefore, a marriage other than a remarriage during this period
would be bigamous.
Turning to the question of the status of the bigamous marriage, we
see in the language of the early cases that such marriages were considered absolutely void. In Zahorka v. Geith,53 which involved a collateral attack on the marriage after the death of the husband, the court
stated that if the wife had not been divorced from her first husband
before she married the deceased then such mariage was absolutely void.
The Zahorka case cites as authority Williams v. Williams,54 which held
that if one of the parties to a marriage already has a lawful spouse,
such marriage is a nullity and is void ab initio.
The statute pertinent to annulment of these marriages is section
247.02(3) which provides for annulment "when such marriage was contracted while either of the parties thereto had a husband or wife living,
at the suit of either party." So we have our first limitation; the action
for annulment of a bigamous marriage may only be brought by a party.
Although the right of action for annulment is generally limited to 10
years by section 247.03(2), there is an exception in the case of a biga§245.03 (1963).
167 Wis. 615, 620, 168 N.W. 704, 706 (1918).
53 129 Wis. 498, 109 N.W. 552 (1906).
5463 Wis. 58, 23 N.W. 110 (1885).
51 Wis. STAT.
52
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mous marriage. Section 247.03(2) provides that the action "may be
commenced at any time while either of the parties has a husband or
wife living.""5 Thus, a second limitation that the right of annulment
terminates upon the death of one of the parties.
However, the right of annulment may be extinguished prior to this
time. By section 245.24, where a bigamous marriage was entered into
in good faith on the part of at least one of the parties, then the parties
to such marriage, though bigamous in its inception, are held to be legally married from and after the removal of the impediment. No subsequent ceremony is required. This means that the marriage can be validated and, as such, is merely voidable and not void. Conversely, where
both parties were aware of the fact that the marriage was illegal, the
marriage is not validated by section 245.24. In this situation, they could
never validate the marriage and it could be attacked collaterally and
declared void. The cases have allowed collateral attack.56
In light of section 245.24, the status of the bigamous marriage turns
upon the question of good faith. Where the marriage was entered into
by one of the parties in good faith it is voidable only as by passage of
time it may be validated. Where the marriage was instead entered into
by both parties with knowledge of its illegality it cannot be validated.
This marriage, therefore, is void absolutely. Although it cannot necessarily be annulled, it can never be validated and can be attacked collaterally both before and after the death of the parties.
V.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is apparent that many of the marriages specifically
declared void by one section of the statutes are made merely voidable
by another section. These include the bigamous marriage where one of
the parties to the marriage acted in good faith; the incestuous marriage;
and, marriages declared void by reason of insanity, idiocy, or other cause
rendering one of the parties thereto incapable of assent to the marriage.
However, not only in these instances, but also in the case of the other
marriages discussed, the right to an annulment may be extinguished.
Where this occurs, and where such marriages are still void, serious inequities can result.
An excellent example of this is the recent case of Ginkowski v.Ginkowski.5 7 The parties to this action married within one year of a prior
divorce of one of the parties with knowledge of the prohibition against
such marriage. Consequently, the marriage was not validated upon removal of the impediment. Furthermore, the statutes expressly declare
such marriage void which would make it subject to collateral attack.
STAT. §247.03(2) (1963).
Estate of Tufts, 228 Wis. 221, 280 N.W. 309 (1938) ; Estate of Van Schaick,

55 Wis.
56

256 Wis. 214, 40 N.W. 2d 588 (1949).

57 28 Wis. 2d 530, 137 N.W. 2d 403 (1965).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

However, over 10 years, had elapsed since the date of the marriage and
the court held that the right of annulment was thereby extinguished
denying relief to the plaintiff-husband.58
But again, as in the Ferguson case,5 9 the court failed to consider all
of the pertinent case law. For example, in Hutschenreuter v. Hutschenreuter,60 the court stated that the issue of the validity of the marriage is always before the court. The Hutschenreuter case involved a
divorce, however, there is no rational basis for limiting this concept
to divorce and denying its application to an action for annulment. It is
submitted, therefore, that if this concept (that the issue of the validity
of the marriage is always before the court) was not impliedly overruled,
it was not the prerogative of the court to deny consideration of the
validity of the marriage. This would have dictated a different result.
The result here is that the plaintiff-husband is left to continue as a
party to a void marriage subject always to collateral attack. Of the two
actions which he might bring to attack the validity of his void marriage,
annulment has been denied leaving only an action to affirm. But in an
action to affirm, the court may only annul or affirm, a result of questionable desirability to the plaintiff-husband. The only apparent solution is
for the husband to leave the state and enter into a second marriage. He
could then commence an action to affirm the second marriage which
could not be denied on the basis of his first marriage because his first
marriage could not constitute a prior existing valid marriage. This
would certainly be an undesirable result. However, the problem now
appears to be solved by the exception of the bigamous marriage from
the 10 year statute of limitations expressed in section 247.03 (2) eliminating the inequities and uncertainties inherent in the Ginkowski decision.
Of course, to effect any remedy for this problem or for the other
problems posed above requires cooperation of both the legislature and
the judiciary with the burden falling more heavily on the legislature.
It is their duty to declare the marriage laws by which the court is bound.
That there is a need for elimination of these problems is patently apparent. Because the legislative intent controls in the field of family law,
the elimination can only be accomplished by an elimination of the ambiguities currently present within the code. This can only be accomplished by a clear expression of legislative intent. It is this clarity of
legislative intent, therefore, which is the alum necessary to dissolve the
obscurring cloud of ambiguity and purify the code of its inequities.
JOHN P. FOLEY
58The court applied the 10 year statute of limitations provision of §330.18(4)

instead of §247.03(2) because the right of annulment expired prior to the
passage of §247.03(2).
59 See note 24.
co 23 Wis. 2d 318, 127 N.W. 2d 47 (1964).

